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ABSTRACT 
Yale mathematician, Benoît B. Mandelbrot, revolutionized the way in which we 
view and understand the natural world. Where earlier visionaries were only 
able to see mathematical “monsters,” Mandelbrot was able to discern nature’s 
geometric masterpiece. This dramatic breakthrough allowed him to 
identify and comprehend patterns and shapes that no one had previously 
understood and led him to develop the field of fractal geometry. Similar 
patterns, this article contends, are deeply embedded in the U.S. Constitution, 
and the metaphor of fractals, therefore, enables us to significantly bolster our 
understanding of the nation’s supreme law. This article, thus, develops the 
fractal theory of American constitutionalism, which posits that profound 
patterns of self-similarity ought to inform our fundamental understanding of 
the Constitution’s inherent structure and elemental coherence. In doing so, this 
novel theory not only illuminates the very nature of the U.S. Constitution and 
its contents, but it elucidates how the Constitution operates and provides a 
foundation for a key method of constitutional interpretation. Finally, the 
fractal theory of American constitutionalism provides a new methodology for 
gauging the document’s tensile strength and exposing historical fault lines and 
present structural weaknesses. In doing so, this theory also provides general 
guidance on how to mend possible constitutional deficiencies. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Salvador Dali’s painting, The Visage of War, depicts a morbid 
disembodied face against the backdrop of a desolate landscape. The face’s 
frozen, furrowed brow, locked-open jaw, and emaciated appearance virtually 
exude the stench of decomposition and instills in the observer the sense of pain 
associated with conflict. Both of the face’s cavernous eye sockets and its open 
mouth all contain reduced-sized versions of the whole image. And within the 
eyes and mouths of those reduced-sized versions are further reduced-sized 
versions of the whole. The clear intent is to suggest that these repetitions 
continue ad infinitum. The surreal, dark work conveys Dali’s conception of the 
infinite horrors of war.1 It is also the case that this artwork exhibits a fractal-
like structure. 
Fractals are geometric shapes. When a fractal is split into parts, its 
respective components possess a property called self-similarity. This means 
that a fractal’s components are each reduced-sized copies of the whole shape. 
Or, conversely, the whole shape is, in a sense, a copy of its pieces. This 
repetition, or perhaps, redundancy, arguably reinforces the fractal shape, at 
least insofar as repetition signifies patterns and relations, and generates clarity. 
Indeed, fracticality provides insights into the nature of geometric shapes, with 
respect to their complexity, dimensions, and scale. Fractal patterns abound in 
nature, and although we have observed them for millennia, the late, revered 
Yale mathematician, Benoît B. Mandelbrot, was the one to coin the term 
“fractal” and develop the field of fractal geometry. Mandelbrot, who was a 
modern-day Renaissance man, not only recognized fractals in nature, but 
discovered fractal patterns in a multitude of fields, including finance, physics, 
architecture, and fractography (the study of the mechanics of fractures in 
materials).2 These patterns not only represented fractal geometry’s remarkably 
wide set of applications, but illuminated key issues in each of these diverse 
areas. So, too, will this article argue that fractals bolster our understanding of 
the nation’s supreme law—the U.S. Constitution. 
Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland, “we 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”3 Indeed, the U.S 
Constitution is more than a mere checklist of clauses memorialized by an ink-
stained parchment. It is also more than a formula or mathematical concept. 
And, the Constitution is not, literally speaking, a mathematical fractal. Yet, the 
Constitution does have a certain, special order to it, something that makes it 
 
 1. Michael Frame & Benoît B. Mandelbrot, A Panorama of Fractals and Their Uses: 
Dali’s Fractal, YALE UNIV., http://classes.yale.edu/fractals/panorama/welcome.html (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2013). 
 2. BENOÎT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS 
xvi (2006). 
 3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
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more than a mere statute. It is not simply the supreme law because it has been 
labeled as such; the Constitution embodies a deep democratic logic. Yet, this 
logic needs to be animated by a diligent, vigilant, and thoughtful populace in 
order for it to have effect. For this to happen, there must be a robust 
understanding of how the Constitution operates. Philip Bobbitt has helped 
improve the clarity of constitutional thought and discourse by delineating 
various methods of constitutional argument, particularly historical, textual, 
doctrinal, structural, prudential, and ethical.4 This article suggests that the 
metaphor of fractals can aid constitutional thought by deepening our 
understanding of the Constitution’s inherent structure. Such an understanding, 
it will be argued, will enable us to better comprehend the Constitution’s 
coherence as well as the profound nature of the document itself and the grand 
themes and principles that it embodies. This understanding, in turn, not only 
illuminates the very concept of the Constitution and its contents, but it also 
highlights the Constitution’s historical fault lines and present structural 
weaknesses. In doing so, the fractal theory of American constitutionalism is 
also prescriptive, because it provides some general guidance on how to 
improve the Constitution, which although a work of genius, still is a work in 
progress. 
To be sure, this is a work on constitutional thought, rather than fractal 
geometry, and, as such, the fractal metaphor should be used with a degree of 
prudence and caution. The metaphor, however, does seem to have heuristic 
value. Hopefully, just as the fractal pattern in Dali’s painting illustrates the 
infinite horrors of war, so too, perhaps, can the recognition of a fractal-like 
structure girding the U.S. Constitution illuminate the document’s eternally 
profound themes and spirit. 
II.  FRACTALS 
Although a complex mathematical understanding of fractals is not required 
for the purposes of this article, a brief discussion of the basic concepts in 
fractal geometry is in order, and a look at some examples of fractals should 
prove useful to understanding how the fractal theory of American 
constitutionalism operates. 
The classical mathematics of the nineteenth century was rooted in the 
regular geometric structures of Euclid and in Newtonian dynamics.5 These 
approaches were useful and furthered understanding up to a point. The 
problem, however, was that certain subsequently discovered mathematical 
structures failed to conform to the patterns of Euclid and Newton.6 
 
 4. Philip Bobbitt, Methods of Constitutional Argument, 23 U. BRIT. COLUMBIA L. REV. 
449, 449 (1989). 
 5. BENOÎT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE 3 (1983). 
 6. Id. 
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Mathematicians regarded these structures as “monsters.”7 Enter Mandelbrot. 
The latter, an Eastern European refugee who spent years in obscurity after 
coming to America, had an unusual gift for recognizing patterns. In his original 
position as a researcher for I.B.M., he would notice patterns in data that 
everyone else had overlooked.8 This talent eventually led him to pioneer fractal 
geometry, which mirrored the real complexity of nature rather than just the 
ideal forms of thought.9 
Fractals produce a kind of paradox. Normally, if one divides a shape into 
separate parts, or zooms in on a portion of that shape, one would expect to see 
simpler shapes—the building blocks of the structure. The shape of a house, for 
example, conforms to this intuition. Viewed from one hundred yards away, a 
standard house will look like a roof atop a set of walls. From ten feet away, 
one can see that this structure is comprised of simpler objects, small 
rectangular tiles and bricks (or some other building materials). Fractals are 
different. 
Take Mandelbrot’s classic example of a cauliflower.10 It is a simple 
enough vegetable, shaped like a tree, complete with what resembles a trunk, 
branches, and canopy. Now, slice off one of its florets. What does one find? A 
small piece of the vegetable, shaped like a whole cauliflower. Now, slice off a 
sub-floret. What does one find? An even smaller piece of the vegetable, but 
again shaped like a whole cauliflower. And, should one continue this process, 
one would find increasingly small pieces of the vegetable, all shaped like a 
whole cauliflower. Therefore, unlike the structure of a standard brick house, 
which when viewed more closely is made up of bricks and mortar, a 
cauliflower’s macroscopic structure is made up of smaller cauliflowers, in 
theory, ad infinitum. It is in this sense that a cauliflower—or more broadly, a 
fractal—is paradoxical. The whole shape, like that of a cauliflower, can be 
quite simple. However, since that whole shape repeats itself as one zooms in 
on it, that shape defies intuition by remaining equally complicated at every 
level of magnification. It is in this sense that fractals are infinitely intricate and 
produce an enigmatic mix of complexity and simplicity.11 
Yet in the midst of this mystery, there is also clarity. As Mandelbrot 
quipped, “there is hardly a paradox without utility.”12 Here, the repetitive 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jascha Hoffman, Benoît Mandelbrot, Novel Mathematician, Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/us/17mandelbrot.html?_r=0. 
 9. James Gleick, Fractal Vision, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2010/12/26/magazine/2010lives.html?_r=0#view=beno_t_mandelbrot. 
 10. Elaine Woo, Benoit Mandelbrot dies at 85; mathematician known as the father of 
fractals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/oct/21/local/la-me-be 
noit-mandelbrot-20101021. 
 11. MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 2, at 145. 
 12. MANDELBROT, supra note 5, at 405. 
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pattern in these so called “monsters” revealed a kind of structural order, and 
have now been organized by fractals into a coherent field, enabling us to better 
understand the world in which we live. Indeed, as it turns out, humans have 
been producing fractal patterns for millennia, dating back 5,000 years to 
kolams in southern India.13 And prior to that, humans had in a sense, been 
breathing, thinking, and even being fractals, as these self-repeating patterns 
have been observed in the bronchioles of our lungs,14 in brain waves,15 and 
even in our DNA,16 respectively. It has been posited that these fractal patterns 
may even help distinguish the beat of a healthy heart from a diseased one,17 
and so perhaps here, too, such an analysis can help assess even the “health” of 
a constitutional democracy. With these basic concepts in mind then, let us now 
turn to how fractals can help us specifically understand the U.S. Constitution 
and its content. 
III.  “POPULAR FRACTICALITY,” CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURAL COHERENCE, 
AND INTERPRETATION 
Fractals have at times been discovered in surprising places. Lucy Pollard-
Gott, for example, has identified striking instances of self-similarity in poetry 
by finding subsets of a poem that bear structural resemblances to the whole.18 
At an even deeper level, certain poems such as Alan Ginsberg’s Howl, repeat 
not just word patterns, but ideas across several scales.19 And likewise, 
structural fractals have been observed in literature, as in Paul Auster’s novel, 
Mr. Vertigo, in which the first sentence “contains the essence of the whole 
book.”20 Perhaps similarly, then, underlying the words and clauses of the 
Constitution is a kind of a meta-structure—a deep, self-repeating pattern that 
shapes the entire document, evidence of which appears in its Preamble, with its 
timeless opening phrase, “We the People.” 
The Preamble’s mere fifty-two words capture the entire Constitution’s very 
essence: popular sovereignty. A phrase that is of both profound simplicity and 
complexity, the Preamble embodies in plain English, the spirit of the 
 
 13. Frame & Mandelbrot, supra note 1, at Kolams, http://classes.yale.edu/fractals/panorama/ 
welcome.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 14. Stacey R. Boser et al., Fractal Geometry of Airway Remodeling in Human Asthma, 172 
AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 817, 821 (2005). 
 15. Yoshiya Shinagawa et al., Fractal Dimensionality of Brain Wave, 6 FORMA 205, 205 
(1991). 
 16. Yu Zu-Guo et al., Fractals in DNA sequence analysis, 11 CHINESE PHYSICS 1313, 1313 
(2002). 
 17. Barry A. Cipra, A Healthy Heart is a Fractal Heart, 36 SIAM NEWS 1, 2 (2003). 
 18. Frame & Mandelbrot, supra note 1, at PollardGott: Other Directions. 
 19. Id. at Cantoring Poetry. 
 20. Id. at Structural Fractals in Literature. 
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Constitution in both word and deed. Madison/Publius declared in The 
Federalist No. 39, 
the real character of the government . . . may be considered in relation to the 
foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its 
ordinary powers are to be drawn . . . and to the authority by which future 
changes in the government are to be introduced.21 
That character here seemed to be starkly defined by the people, as the 
Preamble not only promised popular self-government, but both embodied and 
enacted it.22 Not only would “the people” go on to be the most recurrent phrase 
in the Bill of Rights,23 but it is a self-similar motif incorporated into and 
throughout the 1789 document itself. The document was designed for the 
people, and it was ratified by the people.24 Indeed, as Akhil Amar writes, the 
Constitution was founded on popular sovereignty.25 
The Preamble’s foundational principle of popular sovereignty reverberates 
throughout (virtually) the entire Constitution. It pulsates through the 
Constitution’s various articles and clauses, informs even the order in which the 
former appears,26 and emerges powerfully in Article VII, structuring the 
Constitution from tip to tail. As Amar explains, “[t]extually, Article VII even 
echoes the exact wording of the Preamble, explaining how ‘this Constitution’ 
is to be establish[ed].”27 
The above, though, does lead to a couple of critical questions. First, why is 
this apparent pattern noteworthy? And second, prior to the Bill of Rights, how 
exactly did popular sovereignty manifest itself throughout (most parts of) the 
Constitution? Indeed, we see the existence of other themes, such as separation 
of powers, checks and balances, rule of law, transparency, and various 
Enlightenment values, but what connection might they have to each other and 
to popular sovereignty? This is where a fractal analysis can perhaps be 
informative, offering a unifying theory in constitutional thought. 
The fractal theory essentially answers these questions simultaneously. To 
see how, let us deconstruct and begin by addressing the second question. And 
to do so, a discrete fractal analogy here will help. Let us take a Koch 
snowflake, a fractal resembling an actual snowflake. The structure begins with 
 
 21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 22. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005). 
 23. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 793 (1999). 
 24. Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 675 (2002). 
 25. Id. at 681. 
 26. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 208 (noting that the Constitution has a pyramidal structure 
that conveys a democratic logic, with “the People” as the pyramid’s foundation, then the 
legislature, then the executive, and then the judiciary). 
 27. Amar, supra note 24, at 684. 
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an “initiator”—here, an equilateral triangle.28 Erase the middle third of each 
side of the triangle, and then fill each gap with a “tent” shape (here, another 
equilateral triangle, but minus one full side). At first, this algorithm will 
produce a Star of David, but when applied recursively, will generate a 
snowflake shape. In a sense, the Constitution is structured like a Koch 
snowflake fractal. If we think of the individual person as the “initiator”, and 
“We the People”, or, popular sovereignty as the “tents”, we can go through 
similar iterations of the latter to arrive at the Constitution. Now, the various 
grand Constitutional themes, at first glance, might not look too similar to our 
original “tents.” Indeed, these themes appear to be different from (albeit deeply 
complimentary to) popular sovereignty. But, it is argued here, that just as the 
various branches of the Koch snowflake are repetitions of that original tent 
shape, the Constitution’s grand themes are in actuality permutations of popular 
sovereignty. 
Popular sovereignty is, in one deep sense, a particular conception of 
power. It suggests that, just as an individual ought to have control over her 
own fate and enjoy a deep respect of her personhood and autonomy, so too 
should “the People” have rule over themselves (and indeed, each seems 
impracticable without the other). To realize such popular self-governing and 
self-government, there must exist a particular distribution of political power. A 
deep respect for the equal endowment of the unalienable rights of all human 
beings (ideally) is what logically generates these power relations. I say 
“logically” because “equal” necessarily means that one person or group cannot 
enjoy unalienable rights over and above those of their peers, for any such 
disparity would by definition undermine such a distribution of political power. 
Logically, then, popular sovereignty in the U.S. leaves no room for 
monarchies, oligarchies, aristocracies, or any other such type of rule whereby 
political power is similarly concentrated in the hands of the few. Indeed, 
Madison, who recognized that “power is of an encroaching nature,”29 spoke to 
this in The Federalist No. 39, stating that a republic is “a government which 
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the 
people.”30 
The Constitution’s grand themes, it seems, are essentially analogues of 
popular sovereignty. Just as popular sovereignty calls for an equal distribution 
of political power amongst the populace (insofar as each individual is endowed 
with equal inherent rights which, ideally, instills in them power over their own 
personhood and entitles them to equal respect thereof), the separation of 
powers for instance, evinces that distribution. As Madison/Publius explained in 
The Federalist No. 47, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
 
 28. MANDELBROT, supra note 5, at 42. 
 29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 21, at 237 (emphasis added). 
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executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced 
the very definition of tyranny.”31 Hence, such a separation of powers is 
designed precisely to keep power out of the hands of the few, retain power in 
“the People”, and embody the principle of popular sovereignty. 
Indeed, the same can be said for checks and balances. Madison/Publius 
argued in The Federalist No. 51 that the logic of a system of checks and 
balances fundamentally mirrored that of popular sovereignty: 
This policy of supplying . . . better motives, might be traced through the whole 
system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly 
displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim 
is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may 
be a check on the other — that the private interest of every individual may be a 
sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less 
requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.32 
Checks and balances, then, is also a fractal-like iteration of popular sovereignty 
since, in a critical sense, it is a deep expression of popular self-government. 
And ultimately, the Constitution’s general commitment to (various) 
Enlightenment values also represents yet another iteration of popular 
sovereignty. For instance, the rejection of the idea and practice of conferring 
titles of nobility represents a certain restatement of popular sovereignty, as it 
forbids an upset of the latter’s basic and fundamental diffuse distribution of 
political power. In The Federalist No. 39, Madison/Publius clearly indicated 
that any titles of nobility would be contrary to the very “complexion” of the 
republican system, which enables “that honorable determination which 
animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the 
capacity of mankind for self-government.”33 Indeed, the very concept of 
nobility would elevate one class of individuals above another, and thereby 
undermine any notion of popular sovereignty by invariably altering the sort of 
equal power relations for which it calls. 
Certainly, the list of examples of grand Constitutional themes continues, 
and the above logic would generally apply to those as well. The next relevant 
question then, is why this pattern of popular sovereignty and its iterations 
matter. Essentially, there are two main reasons here: constitutional coherence 
and constitutional interpretation. 
a. Coherence 
The American composer, Charles Wuorinen, observed fractals in music, 
noting that “the same harmonic progression may determine the course of a 
 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 21, at 236. 
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whole movement.”34 Although a fractal pattern does not itself constitute 
“composing”, it is still deeply important because it represents the preparation 
for it. Wuorinen explained that, “[h]aving made such preparation, then, I have 
found it possible to compose with a kind of intuitive freedom which still 
assures macrostructural coherence. Those who try for this coherence without 
structural underpinnings usually fail.”35 Similarly, popular sovereignty and its 
fractal-like iterations in the U.S. Constitution are critical because, it is argued 
here, they form the structural underpinnings of the Constitution and provide for 
the document’s macrostructural coherence. Such coherence is key because it 
makes the Constitution intelligible as a unified body of profound values, rather 
than a mere checklist of discrete clauses. This coherence provides for a certain 
legal richness and texture capable of embodying the nation’s deep democratic 
logic, that a mere set of rules could not. 
In a sense, then, such coherence speaks to the very constitution of the 
Constitution. The latter is not simply a set of concepts that are “merely 
juxtaposed and contingently aggregated under a single rubric.”36 Rather, the 
fractal-like structural underpinning of the Constitution represents a kind of 
implicit ordering principle—a sort of underlying reason, somewhat comparable 
to Kant’s notion of reason. Kant believed that reason serves the important 
function of ordering concepts for, if such concepts are “isolated from one 
another, separated, as it were, by an empty intervening space,”37 then that 
rubric would merely be a compilation of its various components. The U.S. 
Constitution, however, is very much more than the sum of its parts. As 
Laurence Tribe has argued, the Constitution is not merely a set of written 
commands and instructions.38 Rather, in The Invisible Constitution, he posits 
that there is an entire “dark matter” that animates and undergirds much of the 
visible text.39 As such, the Constitution seems to have a kind of conceptual 
fabric, an underlying logic and pattern that holds it together and informs its 
various parts. 
And, under the fractal theory of American constitutionalism, such 
coherence further indicates that, just as the whole shape promotes the various 
parts, the various parts inform the whole structure. We see this cross-
pollination, for instance, in the Article III treason clause which, as Akhil Amar 
pointed out, both contains the Constitution’s grand themes, and also informs 
 
 34. Frame & Mandelbrot, supra note 1, at Music: Wuorinen. 
 35. Id. (emphasis added). 
 36. This phrase is borrowed from Ernest Weinrib, who used it in the context of his treatise 
on private law, but it is apropos here. See ERNEST JOSEPH WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 
88 (1995). 
 37. IMMANUEL KANT, IMMANUEL KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 543 (Norman Kemp 
Smith trans., 1st ed. 1929). 
 38. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 9 (2008). 
 39. Id. at 38. 
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the document as a whole as it seems to have constituted an entire proto-Bill of 
Rights.40 Indeed, a deeper look at additional examples will follow. The 
immediate point, however, is about how the Constitution coheres, and about 
what such coherence tells us about the Constitution and how it operates. Here, 
the Kant-like notion of reason, implicit in the Constitution’s fractal-like 
structure, it seems, functions to arrange the document’s concepts in a way that 
provides for each part of the Constitution to simultaneously condition, and be 
conditioned by, each of the other parts as well as the whole. Like a fractal, 
then, the Constitution is both remarkably complex and yet simple. 
Such coherence, moreover, suggests a certain depth and profoundness to 
the Constitution and the democratic logic and values that it embodies. Since 
the Constitution’s grand themes manifest themselves on broad levels, across 
articles, and in various individual clauses, which generally cohere, those grand 
themes not only tend to be ubiquitous, but also multidimensional. In a fractal-
like fashion, these themes remain equally robust at every level and scale. 
Indeed, that foundational principle of popular sovereignty—whether it be a 
permutation of individual rights or a “generator” of the vast fractal-like 
structure of the Constitution—signifies, thanks to such coherence, a powerful 
coalescence of American statehood and individual personhood, which is most 
fitting for a document that was ratified by and for the People. 
b. Constitutional interpretation. 
Yale historian John Gaddis has used fractals to describe how seemingly 
inconsequential occurrences could spawn historical events.41 By looking at 
how particular incidents could shape larger phenomena, he was able to deduce 
a certain process from the structure of events.42 Indeed, a somewhat similar 
logic is not entirely foreign to the law. Charles Black, for example, posited 
that, in interpreting the Constitution, certain inferences can reasonably be, and 
ought to be, drawn from the structures and relationships created by the 
Constitution,43 suggesting that there exists “a close and perpetual interworking 
between the textual and the relational and structural modes of reasoning.”44 
Such an interaction between the Constitution’s structure and text is of 
particular interest here, because the fractal-like structure of the U.S. 
Constitution indeed provides a certain logic for a type of textual interpretation 
of the document. 
 
 40. AMAR, supra note 22, at 244. 
 41. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: HOW HISTORIANS MAP THE PAST 
25, 83 (2002). 
 42. See id. at 35. 
 43. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 
(1969). 
 44. Id. at 31. 
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The Constitution’s macrostructural coherence, in a way, calls for 
interpretive coherence. Therefore, just as there is a legal principle that like 
cases ought to generally be treated alike, various words and phrases that 
reappear multiple times in the Constitution generally ought to be interpreted in 
a similar fashion. The fractal theory posits that the Constitution is a unified 
body of profound values, and as such, ought to be read in a holistic way. The 
grand, animating principle of popular sovereignty and its various iterations run 
deeply throughout (most) of the Constitution,45 and therefore, reading any 
ambiguous words, phrases, or clauses in a disjunctive fashion would be to 
ignore the document’s deeper thematic relations. Indeed, such a disjointed 
interpretation could threaten to reduce the written Constitution to a mere set of 
rules, rendering its written commands inconsistent with (to borrow a phrase) 
the “invisible Constitution.”46 The latter’s fractal-like pattern signals a certain 
profoundness and consistency, and the words and phrases on the parchment 
are, insofar as it is linguistically possible, supposed to make visible (or at least 
evident) the document’s deep underlying principles. Reading the text as a set 
of disconnected clauses would not merely incline one to understand the 
Constitution’s terms inconsistently, but it would generally function to sever 
word from Constitutional principle. 
Therefore, given the self-similar properties inherent in the Constitution’s 
structure, the document’s wording ought to be, logically, read congruently with 
the latter, in what Amar calls an “intratextual” fashion.47 This mode of 
interpretation, as Amar explains, is methodologically distinct from standard 
doctrinal, historical, prudential, structural, and even textual techniques.48 
Unlike a standard textual interpretation, which Bobbitt explains “rest[s] on a 
sort of ongoing social contract, whose terms are given their contemporary 
meanings continually reaffirmed by the refusal of the People to amend the 
instrument,”49 intratextualism necessarily examines at least two clauses in the 
Constitution in order to underscore the connection between them and 
understand how they might cohere. To be sure, the fractal theory does not 
exclude other modes of constitutional interpretation (provided that those 
methods understand the Constitution in a coherent manner). But it does 
specifically make sense that, where a word or phrase is repeated, and the 
 
 45. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 22, at 35 (noting that Articles V and VI of the Constitution 
“extinguished the right and power of unilateral secession for each state populace that joined 
the . . . union, thereby merging itself into the continental sovereignty of the American people.”). 
 46. TRIBE, supra note 38, at 77. 
 47. Amar, supra note 23, at 788–91. 
 48. See id. (explaining that unlike the traditional texualist approach, which looks to words in 
isolation, intratextualism “always focuses on at least two clauses and highlights the link between 
them.”); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–8 
(1984) (providing a brief summary of the various modes of constitutional interpretation). 
 49. BOBBITT, supra note 48, at 26. 
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principles underlying them are part of a structure that makes the latter self-
similar, then the words or phrases in question should analogously be treated as 
self-similar, fractal-like images of each other, too. 
This apparent pattern in the Constitution, then, seems noteworthy with 
major implications for Constitutional interpretation. Nonetheless, before 
proceeding to the next section, it should be worthwhile here to address a 
possible criticism of the fractal theory and its implications for constitutional 
interpretation. All this self-similarity, particularly with respect to the specific 
mode of constitutional interpretation that the fractal theory logically calls for, 
conceivably might be criticized as promoting a redundant understanding of the 
Constitution. Certainly, insofar as constitutional rules of construction are 
concerned, it is commonly asserted that the document should be read in a way 
so as to avoid redundancy.50 While redundancy is sometimes desirable in life 
(for example, in airplane safety mechanisms), the argument here suggests that, 
with respect to the Constitution, we are to presume that the Framers were 
sound and skillful drafters, and that we are therefore to ask what is the value 
added by each clause.51 The intratextualist method that the fractal theory 
logically suggests as an approach, then, might appear to contravene this rule of 
construction since the self-similarity not only of concepts, but of clauses, 
signals a certain repetitiousness that arguably adds no value. 
Such a criticism of redundancy is misguided. It is useful here to adopt a 
metaphor used by Laurence Tribe. In his piece, “The Curvature of 
Constitutional Space,” Tribe draws on Einstein’s general relativity theory, 
explaining that Einstein posited that space itself is bent, and that the “curved 
space” metaphor was pertinent to the law.52 The metaphor is certainly most 
useful, but its application here is slightly different. In the present context, it is 
material to focus on the material of space. That is, Einstein realized that 
space—that vast void which had previously been thought to be nothingness—
was actually something. That so called emptiness has curvature and may 
indeed be a kind of fabric of our universe. Similarly, the alleged absence of 
value added by redundancy misconstrues repetition as devoid of meaning. In 
actuality, as Amar explains, such redundancy is illuminative and bolsters 
clarity, making that which had been implicit more explicit.53 In so doing, 
 
 50. Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. 
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 51. Id. at 12. 
 52. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn 
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1989) (“A parallel conception in the legal 
universe would hold that, just as space cannot extricate itself from the unfolding story of physical 
reality, so also the law cannot extract itself from social structures.”). 
 53. See Amar, supra note 50, at 2, 20. 
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intratextualism (if performed non-mechanically and sensibly54) thus operates to 
explicate the text and highlight the conceptual fabric of the Constitution. 
Now that we have seen what such fractal analysis reveals about the nature 
of the Constitution and why this is significant, let us return to some additional, 
noteworthy examples of constitutional fracticality. 
IV.  ARTICLE I, SECTION 10: ATTAINDER, EX POST FACTO, AND NOBILITY 
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides fertile ground for an 
examination of constitutional fracticality. This section’s prohibition on bills of 
attainder, ex post facto laws, and conferrals of titles of nobility represents a 
powerful iteration of the Constitution’s grand themes, and further functions as 
a generator for recurrences of these very same themes elsewhere.55 Indeed, 
popular sovereignty seems to animate these prohibitions. “We the People” 
signals a government by and for the people, and as such, no one may be above 
the law. A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or a title of nobility, would each 
contravene this principle. A bill of attainder would essentially create a class of 
one—namely, the individual targeted by the legislation. While that one person 
would be subject to the law in question, all others, by corollary, would be 
above it. As such, it would create a society in which there would be a de facto 
class of “power-crats”—a class of privileged legislators who would enjoy the 
authority to wield governmental law-making powers against specific 
individuals. As such, this would contravene popular sovereignty because this 
would in effect be a censorial power in the Government over the people, for no 
one would be safe from such punitive legislation. 
Ex post facto laws would offend popular sovereignty in a similar way, for 
as Amar explains, such retroactive statutes could equally be used to target a 
specific victim by “reverse engineer[ing] an attainder,” substituting the exact 
description of the victim’s past, innocent conduct for his name.56 Titles of 
nobility, likewise, would transgress popular self-government, for any 
hereditary Congressional posts would not signify representation of, 
accountability to, and sovereignty in the people, but rather authority on the 
basis of bloodline. It is for this reason that Hamilton/Publius remarked in The 
Federalist No. 84, 
 
 54. See Amar, supra note 23, at 799–800 (noting that intratextualism, when carried to 
extremes, can lead to misinterpretations if overly “mystical,” too “mechanical,” or exclusive of all 
other tools of interpretation). 
 55. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 124 (“With this short list of don’ts protecting individual 
liberty and republican equality against Congress and the states, the Constitution offered, in 
miniature, a stylistic and conceptual template for the later Bill of Rights and Reconstruction 
Amendments.”). 
 56. Id. at 125. 
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[n]othing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of 
nobility. This may truly be denominated the cornerstone of republican 
government; for so long as they are excluded there can never be serious danger 
that the government will be any other than that of the people.57 
Certainly then, the Framers designed a document that was in sharp contrast 
with English practices, where bills of attainder were permitted, titles of nobility 
were conferred, and sovereignty resided in the Parliament rather than the 
people.58 
Article I, section 10 exhibits fracticality, moreover, not only because this 
particular section is shaped by the overarching theme of popular sovereignty, 
but because in its mere fifty-seven words, it essentially captures all of the 
complex contours of this principle that animates the entire Constitution. The 
Attainder Clause, as Amar suggests, promotes separation of powers by 
dichotomizing penal adjudication from penal lawmaking since it makes it the 
exclusive domain of the judiciary to apply laws against named individuals,59 
and also affirms checks and balances by “preventing any single branch of 
government from unilaterally depriving persons of life, liberty, or property.”60 
The section’s prohibition against ex post facto laws encourages open and 
transparent government, both by preventing the sort of legislative duplicity 
described above, and by enabling individuals to know what is the law prior to, 
rather than subsequent to, acting.61 And, the forbiddance on conferrals of titles 
of nobility reflects the Enlightenment value that individuals ought to be 
recognized for their deeds rather than their descent.62 
Indeed, this pattern of self-similarity is not only evident within Article I, 
section 10, but this section also in turn informs other areas of the Constitution, 
generating even deeper self-similarity. In a variety of ways, this section, to 
borrow a phrase, functioned as a “proto-Bill of Rights.”63 The ban on bills of 
attainder and ex post facto laws prevented the threat of punitive legislation that 
could inhibit free speech; the attainder clause, as Amar explains, “implicates 
rights of individualized adjudicatory process—due process rights of notice and 
the opportunity to be heard”;64 and the prohibitions of attainder and ex post 
facto laws arguably adumbrates protections against cruel and unusual 
punishments—all thereby foreshadowing the First, Fifth and Eighth 
 
 57. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) 
(emphasis added). 
 58. AMAR, supra note 22, at 103, 124–25. 
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 61. Id. at 210. 
 62. AMAR, supra note 22, at 243. 
 63. Id. at 244. 
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amendments, respectively.65 Additionally, Article I, section 10 operated as 
proto-Reconstruction Amendments: the bar against attainders portended the 
principle underlying the prohibition against slavery by illuminating the evils of 
persecuting individuals for who they were rather than what they did.66 
Attainders are, as Amar suggested, “all about equality”67 and, thus, forecasted 
the idea of equal protection; and, the ban on granting titles of nobility (and thus 
hereditary Congressional posts) would help ensure that the right to vote goes 
unabridged. Consequently, there seems to be evidence of deep self-similarity 
on a variety of levels and scales. 
V.  REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT CLAUSE 
Fracticality abounds in the U.S. Constitution, and it is evident in the 
Article IV, section 4 Republican Form of Government Clause.68 The 
Reconstruction Era senator, Charles Sumner called it a “sleeping giant in the 
Constitution,”69 and certainly, it embodies yet another repetition of the 
Constitution’s monumental theme, popular sovereignty. Laurence Tribe 
alluded to this repetition when he noted that “it would be very hard to say that 
this clause embodies some unique vision of popular sovereignty,”70 and Akhil 
Amar has stated that “the big idea [of the Republican Government Clause] was 
to shore up popular sovereignty.”71 Madison, who explained in The Federalist 
No. 43 the significance of such a provision, likewise recognized a pattern, for 
he indicated that the provision would be at the very least a “harmless 
superfluity”72—or in this context, a necessary redundancy, a crucial element of 
self-similarity, promoting Constitutional coherence. 
Equally, the Clause encapsulates the complexities of this central 
underlying principle of the Constitution, thereby not only cementing the 
philosophical integrity of the document, but bolstering the cohesion of the 
nation. Indeed, the Republican Government Clause captures the wholeness of 
popular sovereignty, advancing critical tenets of indivisibility of the nation, 
checks and balances, and the ban on conferring titles of nobility. As Amar 
elucidated, a tyranny in any state would constitute “a geostrategic threat to 
each and every neighboring state.”73 The materialization of such tyrannies, and 
even the threat of such dangers, could thwart the People’s pledge to “form a 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 219. 
 67. Id. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government”). 
 69. CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
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more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for 
the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and Our Posterity”.74 For, as Madison/Publius wrote in 
The Federalist No. 43, “[t]he more intimate the nature of such a union may be, 
the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each 
other.”75 As such, Article IV, section 4 advanced the key notion of 
indivisibility of the nation. 
The Republican Government Clause, moreover, expounded the concept of 
checks and balances. By guaranteeing to every state a republican form of 
government, Article IV, section 4 created an environment in which each state 
would effectively check and balance each other.76 The Clause preempted the 
conceivable objection that a state might be construed as somehow “nosy” or 
meddlesome if it were to keep watch over its neighbor’s affairs. As Madison 
explained, states in a more perfect union acquire “the greater right to insist that 
the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be 
substantially maintained,” and what better location for that right than in the 
Constitution.77 Moreover, the concept of checks and balances embedded here, 
operates on additional levels. According to Tribe, for example, it takes little 
imagination to interpret this Clause as a prohibition against “the open-ended 
delegation of direct governmental authority over others’ lives to private 
individuals neither elected by the people nor appointed by anyone so 
elected.”78 As such, Article IV, section 4 helps to ensure a certain political 
accountability, in which the people have power over politicians, and, thus, act 
as a check on the latter. 
And, by forbidding such a delegation of unfettered governmental power, 
the Republican Government Clause effectively functions as a ban on nobility. 
Indeed, such a disallowance in the U.S. of aristocracy, monarchy, or any such 
type of unaccountable governmental post, is the logical corollary of 
maintaining sovereignty in the people. Put differently, if Article IV, section 4 
is all about popular sovereignty—and indeed it is—then it necessarily leaves 
no room for titles of nobility, and as such, operates as a prohibition against it. 
Furthermore, the Republican Government Clause not only has properties 
of constitutional self-similarity, but it simultaneously produces further 
iterations. In certain respects, the Clause resembles a proto-Fourteenth 
Amendment. Article IV, section 4’s protocol that each state be guaranteed a 
republican form of government tenably provided a logical blueprint for the 
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“incorporation” doctrine.79 The underlying importance of consistency and 
coherence that helps drive the Republican Government Clause, similarly 
informs the well-established judicial principle that the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies, or “incorporates,” nearly all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
against states. 
Lastly, on another level, we see what in fractal geometry is called, a 
cascade effect. A “cascade” in this context is a generating mechanism.80 
According to Mandelbrot, “[w]hen each piece of a shape is geometrically 
similar to the whole, both the shape and the cascade that generate it are called 
self-similar.”81 Here then, states’ republican governments, and the U.S. 
Constitution’s “generating mechanism” contained in Article IV, section 4, 
appear to have that property of self-similarity. As such, we see another fractal-
like iteration, here not just within the U.S. Constitution itself, but between the 
latter and state constitutions, thereby introducing profound elements of self-
similarity on an even smaller scale, promoting a synergetic structure that 
buttresses American democracy at every scale. 
VI.  FRACTOGRAPHY: CONSTITUTIONAL FAULT-LINES AND STRUCTURAL 
WEAKNESSES 
There remains a critical, looming question. This was foreshadowed, and 
indeed, the reader might have noticed important qualifiers throughout, such as 
the statement that popular sovereignty runs through “virtually” the entire 
Constitution. The question, put in stark terms, is: “what about slavery”? 
Slavery plagued lives and U.S. history. Does the fractal theory simply handle 
such a major, tragic aspect of the American story with a few qualifiers, in order 
to substantially align history with the theory’s tenets? No. The theory makes no 
attempt to describe slavery in fractal terms. To be clear, slavery is 
fundamentally anti-fractal. Yet, this is not a weakness of the fractal metaphor. 
On the contrary, this is where the fractal theory of American constitutionalism 
does some of its most important work. Let us recall that fractals have an 
application in fractography, a field that studies the mechanics of fractures in 
materials, models crack growth behavior, and practices failure analysis. 
Similarly, the fractal theory of American constitutionalism, far from writing 
off anti-fractal elements as anomalous, in fact highlights these deep flaws, 
signals that they may represent fault lines or structural weaknesses in the 
Constitution’s makeup, and provides at least some general prescriptions on 
how to mend these fractures, cracks, and chasms. 
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A simple fractal-like and fractographic-style failure analysis reveals not 
only the obvious, deep moral problems with slavery, but also illuminates how 
slavery introduced to the Constitution a significant element of egregious 
incoherence. The Three-Fifths Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause each 
fundamentally contravened popular sovereignty and its iterations.82 The first 
and clearest level on which this occurred was that slavery ineluctably violated 
the personhood of blacks. Whereas American statehood was inspired by a 
certain idea of individual personhood, where a people should have power over 
themselves just as an individual ought to be able to decide her own fate, the 
very notion of slavery contradicted this principle. But alas, this argument 
would have lacked sway in early America, as slaves were not considered part 
of the constitutional compact.83 Yet, the fractal theory demonstrates how, 
nevertheless, the Three-Fifths Clause and Fugitive Slave Clause both failed on 
their own terms. 
The fractal theory of American constitutionalism, as noted, holds that self-
similarity is a key component for constitutional coherence. Popular 
sovereignty, it is argued here, is the Constitution’s fundamental principle, and 
as such, it and its iterations must permeate the Constitution. The Three-Fifths 
Clause and Fugitive Slave Clause contravene popular sovereignty, even if 
slaves were not considered part of the constitutional compact. First, let us 
return to popular sovereignty as a particular conception of power. If power is 
to fundamentally reside in the great body of the people, rather than be 
concentrated in the hands of the few in an unjust manner, then slavery—and 
the Three-Fifths Clause in particular—undermined such a distribution because 
it concentrated political power in the slave holders insofar as they enjoyed 
proportionately more voting power than their counterparts in free states. That 
is, slave states could increase their number of seats in Congress by acquiring 
more slaves, thereby inflating the political power of each of their citizens 
relative to those in free states. This kind of disparity of voting power between 
citizens in slave states and free states was, thus, itself a violation of popular 
sovereignty. Indeed, the 650,000 slaves in 1793 gave the South an extra 
thirteen seats in the House.84 This grave inconsistency even created further 
“cracks” in the structure, for in a similar fashion, slavery inflated slave owners’ 
power in presidential elections via the electoral college. The slave state of 
Virginia circa 1800, for instance, enjoyed twenty-five percent more electoral 
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votes than the free state of Pennsylvania, even though the latter had ten percent 
more free persons than the former.85 
Likewise, this accumulation of disproportionate political power in the 
hands of slave owners created a condition similar, in principle, to aristocracy. 
Slave owners unjustly bolstered their political power, undermining the credo of 
one person, one vote. Fittingly, Akhil Amar has used the term, “slavocrats,”86 
and it is thus clear how, in this way, slavery offended the Constitution’s ban on 
nobility. It is perhaps less than surprising that such inconsistencies, such 
incoherence, caused deep tensions and tectonic friction. Certainly, in this way 
too, slavery undercut the Constitution’s theme of indivisibility of the nation. 
Slavery’s profound lack of self-similarity to popular sovereignty and its 
iterations created a constitutional fault line, ultimately turning the nation on 
itself in the Civil War. 
To borrow a phrase, “[a]lthough America has not always been smart, at 
least she has been lucky — so far.”87 Here, fortunately, freedom prevailed and 
the Reconstruction Amendments, reflecting inter alia Republican Government, 
rule of law, and of course, popular sovereignty reconstructed the very structure 
of the Constitution in key respects, bolstering coherence where the deep 
inconsistencies created by the Three-Fifths Clause and Fugitive Slave Clause 
had severely compromised macrostructural integrity. Hence, an important 
lesson emerges here. The fractal theory not only demonstrates that the 
Constitution has deep elements of self-similarity, but that it ought to have the 
property of self-similarity since the latter is an essential ingredient in 
Constitutional coherence. Therefore, an absence of self-similarity could signal 
structural fault lines as in the examples just discussed, or even structural 
weaknesses that should be addressed. 
The electoral college, to this day, represents such a structural weakness. 
Apart from what policy arguments exist either for or against the electoral 
college, the fractal theory shows that it is incoherent in the constitutional 
paradigm. As alluded to above, the original concept of the electoral college is 
epistemologically connected to the Three-Fifths Clause, in that it enabled the 
Southern states to count (three fifths of) their slaves toward their allotment of 
electoral college votes.88 Even though slavery has been abolished, and even 
though no less than ten post-1791 constitutional amendments have either 
directly or indirectly reformed the electoral college,89 the latter continues to 
undercut the precept of one person, one vote. While the electoral college might 
not, today, signify a fault line, it does, it is argued here, represent a structural 
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weakness for the notion of unequal voting power runs contrary to the principle 
of popular sovereignty. The reason is that, if some individuals have more 
weighty votes than others then in principle it means that, all other things being 
equal, those persons have proportionately more political power than the 
individuals with less weighty votes, thus, in essence, giving the former at least 
a modicum of political rule over the latter. 
While the electoral college might not be creating a fault line in the way 
that slavery did, the former nevertheless produces structural weaknesses, which 
can contribute to instability, as evidenced by the numerous occasions on which 
a presidential candidate was denied residency in the White House despite 
securing a plurality of the popular vote.90 While the fractal theory might not 
offer specific details on how to solve this problem (indeed, it is not a panacea), 
it does function to expose the dilemma. And by illuminating the nature of the 
Constitution and constitutional coherence, fractal theory provides general 
guidance on how to fix these flaws by pointing us not towards makeshift 
solutions, but toward coherent amendments that naturally coalesce with the 
deeply integrated structure of the Constitution. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the present length of the U.S. Constitution is less than that of this 
article, the former’s profound tenets have animated a way of life for hundreds 
of millions of people over several generations. “We the People” are but three 
simple words that, in a fractal-like fashion, have generated a philosophical 
harmony that set the tone for the entire Constitution and the nation that it 
binds. Indeed, the fractal theory helps us to hear all of the Constitution’s tonal 
elements, understand its composition, appreciate how its clauses work in 
concert, and identify which of its notes, despite its overall majesty, are off key. 
Indeed, the fractal theory of American constitutionalism has illuminated 
telling patterns of self-similarity, cohesiveness, and profoundness in the 
Preamble and Article VII, the Treason Clause, the Attainder Clause, the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws, the ban on granting titles of nobility, the 
Republican Government Clause, the Bill of Rights, and in state constitutions. 
To be sure, this is far from a comprehensive list of examples, for one need not 
strain to find fracticality elsewhere, as in the Article I, section 6 free speech 
clause, the Vesting Clauses, or the compensation of Senators and 
Representatives, for instance. Recognizing such patterns opens up seminal 
opportunities for vital insights into the nature of the Constitution, its structure, 
contents, and operation, as well as provides guidance on logical methods of 
interpreting the document. And conversely, the fractal theory provides 
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assistance in diagnosing dilemmas in the Constitution, as well as general 
guidance on how to address them. It is in this way that the fractal approach 
aids the voice of the American people, for it bolsters an understanding of the 
democratic symphony, thereby better enabling all to participate in, contribute 
to, and sustain the harmony in a meaningful way. 
 
